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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERLENE LODDER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY and RICHARD WHITE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7809 
Respondendent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The rather brief Statement of Facts contained at 
pages 1 to 5 of Appellants' brief is not controverted 
excepting in the following particulars: 
Plaintiff's amended and supplemental Complaint 
does not "repeat" the allegations of injuries stated in 
the original Complaint, but properly reveals that, 
since the time of the original Complaint, Plaintiff had 
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experienced additional and long continuing symp-
toms which indicated a permanent neck injury CR. 2, 
28). 
Second South Street at the point of the intersec-
tion in question is not 132 feet wide but is 93 feet 
wide fro1n curb to curb CR. 53, Ex. A). The distance 
from the south curb line to the crossing watchman's 
shack is an additional 43 feet south CR. 53, Ex. A.). 
The first switch north of Second South is not 55 feet 
north but 64 feet from the north curb line CR. 53, 
Ex. A). The second switch north of Second South is 
not 170 feet north of Second South but 201 feet north 
of the north curb line CR. 53, Ex. A); the second 
switch is 137 feet north of the first switch CR. 53, 
Ex. A). The third switch is 741h feet north of the 
second switch, a total of 2751h feet north of the north 
curb line of Second South. 
Although Mr. White testified CR. 198) that the 
locomotive approached the intersection at 5 or 6 miles 
an hour, Mr. Bond testified CR. 246) that the loco-
motive was going 7 or 8 miles an hour. 
Mr. Bond did not testify that the rear of the 
locomotive was a few feet north of the north line of 
Second South when he looked east and saw plaintiff's 
autom:~bile. He does testify that the locomotive was 
in that position when he first gave a "wash-out" 
signal to the hostler CR. 234) . Mr. Bond testified 
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p. 2+5) that his first glance "·here he could see up the 
street was by the No. + switch, which was 64 feet 
north of the north curb line and was 33~ feet north 
of the sidewalk. 
Mr. Lodder testified that he first saw the loco-
motive 'vhen he was within about four or five car 
lengths of the tracks ( R. 69, 84), not five or six, as 
Appellants state. The automobile was dragged 36 
feet by the locomotive before it was disengaged ( R. 
196, 252). Exhibit 1 shows the nature and extent of 
the damage caused to the automobile by the collision. 
Plaintiff's injuries were received not only by 
striking her head against the automobile but in the 
snapping or whiplash motion which caused her 
sprained neck ( R. 131 ) . 
This brief statement of facts is not, however, 
relied on either by Appellants or Respondent as ade-
quate to fully inform the Court as to the circum-
stances surrounding the accident and injury. 
Throughout their brief, Appellants have referred to 
the facts in detail as they have considered some eight 
points of appeal. Respondent has done likewise ·in 
the hope that, by such a treatment of the facts, the 
Court will be better assisted in fairly appraising the 
facts. 
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Statement of Points 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE ACTIONABLE 
NEGLIGENCE. 
II and Ill 
THE VERDICT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDG-
MENT. 
IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED ALL MATERIAL ISSUES 
AND INSTRUCTED ON THEM. 
v 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE 
QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
VI 
THE ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WERE ALL SUP- 1i,P.: 
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 1ara 
VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPEL-
LANTS TO. THE TIME LIMIT FOR CLOSING ARGUMENT 
WHICH THEY VOLUNTARILY AGREED UPON. 
VIII 
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DID NOT INDI- ~no 
CATE PASSION, PREJUDICE OR CORRUPTION. l1li1 
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Point I 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO PROVE 
ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE 
Respondent contends and respectfully submits 
that the evidence is amply sufficient to prove action-
able negligence on the part of both appellants. 
Before takin-g up the three types of negligence 
relied on, Respondent wishes to make the record clear 
on the point raised at p. 8 of Appellants' Brief. It 
is not true that Respondent does "not claim or assert 
that either of the railroads or their servants failed or 
neglected to give any signal or warning required by 
any statute or ordinance." Defendants submitted as 
an interrogatory (R. p. 7) the question, "What par-
ticular and specific wilful, reckless negligent and 
unlawful acts does each of the plaintiffs refer to and 
claim that the D. & R. G. was and is guilty of in 
Para. 1, of the complaint?" To this, plaintiffs an-
swered (R. p. 10.) among other things, "That its 
servant and employee, Richard White, was then and 
t}:lere acting as the engineer in charge of the back-
ward movement of said diesel locomotive and in the 
course of his said employment, negligently and un-
lawfully failed and neglected*** to cause the whistle 
or horn of said locomotive to be sounded (as the loco-
motive approached the intersection of 2nd South and 
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4th West Streets) notwithstanding at the said time 
and place it was dark and snow was falling." 
It was not necessary to plead more specifically 
the applicability of Section 77-0-14, U. C. A. 1943, as 
amended by L. Utah 1943, Ch. 82, Sec. 1, p. 124. 
This statute required the defendants under these cir-
cumstances to sound the locomotive whistle before 
entering the· crossing on penalty of being guilty of a 
misdemeanor plus liability "for all damages which 
any person may sustain by reason of such violation." 
THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO KEEP THE LOOKOUT OF 
REASONABLE, PRUDENT PERSONS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Quite the contrary of Appellants' position, Re-
spondent submits that the trial court was warranted 
in submitting the issue of negligent failure to main-
tain a lookout on three separate and independent 
factual grounds, as follows: 
(1) 
The hostler's helper, Mr. Bond, either did not 
see and observe the Ladder car as soon as it was 
possible to do so, or else he negligently failed to give 
the signal to the hostler as soon as he did see the car. 
Since it took the hostler plus his helper to keep 
a lookout, (Br. p. 10) and since the helper's signal 
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\vas part of the method by which the lookout was 
kept, failure to promptly signal would be tantamount 
to a negligent failure to keep a lookout. The helper 
was the "eyes" through which the engineer was 
obliged to "see." 
The hostler's helper, Mr. Bond, testified that 
he saw the Lodder car when it was approximately 
200 feet east of the tracks, ( R. p. 233, 245) He then 
testified that the locomotive moved fifty to fifty-five 
feet from the point where he, Bond, jumped and sig-
nalled to the point of collision ( R. p. 246) ; but that 
the locomotive moved two car lengths or approxi-
mately ninety feet from the point where he first saw 
the car to the point of collision (R. p. 246.) He care-
fully makes the distinction between the point where 
he first saw the car, and the point where he jumped. 
( R. p. 246) He did not signal until after or as he 
jumped. (R. 233.) He knew in his mind there was 
going to be a collision the moment he first observed 
the car. ( R. p. 233) . The train was moving seven or 
eight miles an hour. (R. p. 246.) 
If Bond did not jump and signal for thirty-five 
to forty feet after he first saw the car and knew of 
the danger, he waited (assuming 10 feet per second) 
three and one-half or four seconds, before he gave the 
warning. Normal reaction time at seven or eight 
miles an hour is not more than ten· to twelve feet. 
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From this testimony, the jury could reasonably 
conclude either that Bond did not jump and signal 
within a reasonable time after seeing the car, or that 
he did not in fact see the car as soon as it could be 
seen because he failed to keep a proper lookout? 
The same point is perhaps even more graph-
ically demonstrated by another aspect of Mr. Bond's 
testimony, as follows: 
Bond testified that when he jumped he lit right 
on the sidewalk at the curb line. <R. p. 246) But 
he says that he was at or by the No.4 switch when 
he first saw the Ladder car. (R. p. 245) The distance 
from the curb line to the first switch north of the 
street is sixty-four feet. (Ex. A., R. p. 52.) If the 
jury accepted this testimony of Bond's, then it must 
have concluded he waited two thirds of the distance 
from the point where the car was first seen to the 
point of collision (said by Bond to be approximately 
90 feet (R. p. 246), before jumping and signalling. 
Or else he did not actually see the car when he says 
he did, i. e. when he first could have seen it back by 
the first switch north of second south. (Appellants 
agree at p. 10 of their brief that Bond first had an 
opportunity to observe and did in fact first see the 
Lodder car when "the rear of the locomotive was 
about at the switch nearest Second South." For this 
they cite R. p. 243, but no language on that page 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
seems to bear on the point.) (Note also that Bond re-
peatedly refers to the first switch north of Second 
South as ''No.+ switch.") (R. 243, 245.) 
Since Bond also testified (though somewhat 
more indefinitely) that he jumped and signalled 
"vhen he first saw the Lodder car, (R. p. 233, 245) the 
jury might 'veil conclude that he did not see it till 
he \vas nearly at the curb line, and hence did not 
keep a proper lookout, else he would have seen it at 
the first switch. 
(2) 
The Hostler, Mr. White, either failed to keep a 
lookout or negligently failed to respond to the wash 
out signal given by Mr. Bond. 
Mr. White, the hostler, testified on direct (R. p. 
199) and also on cross (R. p. 220) that the locomotive 
in question could be stopped at this intersection on 
the rails in the condition prevailing the night of the 
accident, in sixty to seventy feet. Notwithstanding 
this fact, Mr. White admitted (R. p. 220) that it took 
him ninety feet to stop after he began to apply the 
air brakes. There is no explanation tendered for 
this inconsistency. Mr. White says he was only 
going five or six miles per hour at the time he entered 
the intersection (R. p. 220) and that he applied the 
independent air the moment he saw Bond jump, (R. 
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p. 219) and applied the emergency air and sand the 
moment he saw the car coming into sight (R. p. 221) 
and that he had already seen Bond jump before he 
saw the car ( R. p. 219). Officer Farnsworth testified 
( R. p. 252) that the street is ninety feet wide, that 
the point of collision was thirty feet south of the 
north curb line, and that the locomotive moved sixty-
one feet after the impact. 
The jury could have concluded from these facts 
that Mr. White did not stop in the sixty to seventy 
feet that was possible, because he was not aware of 
the signal or the approach of the Lodder car until he 
was already into the intersection. At the very least 
there is a clear split between Bond's testimony and 
White's. The physical facts show that the car could 
be seen by Bond before the rear end of the locomotive 
on which he was standing came to the sidewalk and 
Bond insisted he first saw it 200 feet east of the track. 
If Bond signalled when he first saw or could have 
seen, then White was not looking or he could have 
stopped short of the point of collision. It was not for 
the court to reconcile these inconsistencies-the issue 
of reasonable lookout was properly submitted to the 
jury for its determination. 
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(3) 
A reasonable lookout under the circumstances 
would have included an observance of the position 
and signals of the crossing watchman. 
Mr. White admitted that it would take sixty to 
seventy feet to stop the locomotive at the time and 
place in question. (R. 199, 220) White also stated 
that after the rear end of the locomotive passed the 
switch some 64 feet north of the intersection, he could 
no longer see the crossing watchman from his posi-
tion on the right side of the cab. (R. p. 213, 206.) 
Mr. Bond testified (R. 243, 244) that after the loco-
motive started down from the switch he, Bond, didn't 
"keep track" of the watchman-"didn't have time to 
watch him all the time"-and never saw him again 
after he gave the proceed signal when the locomotive 
\vas at the northernmost switch. 
If White and Bond can without any help from 
the crossing watchman safely bring the locomotive 
backwards into the intersection by maintaining a dili-
gent and reasonable lookout, there may be no negli-
gence in failing to provide White with a fireman on 
the left side of the cab who can see the watchman, or 
in Bond failing to observe the watchman and his 
signals. But here the facts seem to be that the train 
requires at least sixty to seventy feet (or ninety-one 
feet) to stop; that if Bond was not negligently failing 
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to keep a lookout, he did signal as soon as the auto-
mobile could be seen; and if White was not failing to 
keep a lookout, he did apply the air brake as soon as 
the signal was given-and yet the train could not be 
stopped until it passed over the entire intersection. 
Hence it is reasonable to suppose that only by having 
Bond keep a lookout which included an observation 
of the location and signals of the crossing watchman, 
could the locomotive be safely brought into the inter-
section, and only thus could a reasonable lookout be 
maintained. And in this case where Bond's observ-
ance of the crossing watchman would have revealed 
that the latter was not stationed in the intersection 
or giving warning of the approach of the locomotive, 
Bond's lookout would have required a warning signal 
to White of the absence of-the usual watchman. Thus 
Bond's failure to keep a lookout for Walters, the cross-
ing watchman-or the failure of the defendant to 
provide White with a fireman in the cab who could 
watch out the left side and see the crossing watch 
man, could reasonably have been found by the jury 
to be the proximate cause of the collision. 
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DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO STOP THE LOCOMOTIVE 
AFTER THE TRAINMEN WERE AWARE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
POSITION OF PERIL 
In vie\iv of the answers to Questions 13 to 18 
(Br. p. 37), it is evident that the jury concluded that 
neither plaintiff nor the driver of her car was guilty 
of contributory negligence as they approached the 
intersection. Consequently, the negligent failure of 
the trainmen to stop the locomotive or blow the 
·whistle after the plaintiff's position of peril was evi-
dent to them, we submit, is primary negligence. 
If, however, the defendants' negligence in this 
regard amounts to last clear chance as a matter of 
legal analysis, nevertheless, it was a conscious and 
actionable last clear chance, as follows: 
As Appellants have stated in their Brief, p. 10: 
"He (Bond) estimated that the automo-
bile was 200 feet east of the tracks when he 
observed it. At that time, the rear of the loco-
motive was about at the switch nearest Second 
South. ( 64 feet from the curb.) Before the 
rear of the locomotive reached this point, Bond 
had no view of automobiles approaching from 
the East. The moment he saw the automobile 
he realized that it would be unable to stop 
before reaching the tracks. He immediately 
jumped off and gave the engineer an emer-
gency stop signal." 
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Mr. White testified (R. p. 199, 220) that with a 
locomotive of this type and in view of the weather 
conditions then prevailing, he could bring the loco-
motive to a stop within sixty to seventy feet. 
From this testimony, the jury could conclude 
that there was a clear and conscious opportunity to 
stop the locomotive before it reached the point of 
collision, which was 94 feet south of the switch 
nearest Second South. Likewise from this testimony 
the jury could find that had the whistle been sounded 
when Bond claims he first saw the car 200 feet east 
of the track, the p~aintiff's husband, driving in a 
reasonable and prudent manner, as the jury found 
he was, would have been given opportunity to bring 
his car to a gradual and safe stop short of the tracks. 
There was therefore sufficient evidence to war-
rant the submission of Questions 8 and 9 to the jury. 
Rather than the situation in Van Waggoner vs. 
Union Pacific R. Co. (186 P. 2d 293) where the Court 
found that: 
"Under the most strained construction of 
the facts, the train crew could not have antici-
pated deceased's presence on the track until the 
train had reached a point approximately 220 
feet from the point of impact, and this was half 
the distance necessary to stop the train * * *" 
the instant case presents a factual situation 
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where the train cre\Y did actually observe the pres-
ence of plaintiff when there \vas once and a half as 
much distance as the crew required to stop the loco-
motive. 
The Holmgren case, 198 P. ~d +59, 1s clearly 
distinguishable on the san1e ground. 
THE UNLAWFUL AND NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN OF THE 
APPROACH OF THE LOCOMOTIVE 
Under their point entitled "Alleged Failure To 
Give Warning of Approach of Locomotive," Appel-
lants have thrown together three arguments which 
better lend themselves to analysis and understanding 
when isolated and treated as three separate issues, 
as follows: 
( 1.) Did the train crew unlawfully fail 
to sound the locomotive \vhistle before enter-
ing this intersection during a snowstorm? 
(2.) Did the crossing watchman station 
himself in the intersection or give a reasonable 
warning of the approach of the locomotive as 
required by the voluntary practice of the de-
fendant railroad? 
(3.) Assuming unlawful failure to warn 
by whistle or negligent failure to warn by the 
crossing watchman, was the alleged negli-
gence of plaintiff's driver the sole proximate 
cause of the collision and of the injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff. 
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(1) 
Mr. White adntitted (R. p. 212) that he was two-
thirds of a block north of the intersection in a snow-
storm and standing still with the locomotive when 
he blew the only warning whistle before proceeding 
to and entering the intersection; that the whistle was 
sounded only in response to the proceed signal of the 
crossing watchman, who was also acting as a switch-
man (R. 277, 278), that he thereafter waited one or 
two seconds before releasing the air; consumed four 
or five seconds in releasing the air; and then pro-
ceeded to the point of collision at five or six miles 
per hour. 
Respondent submits this would not satisfy the 
requirement of Sec. 77-0-14 U. C. A. 1943, as amended, 
which requires a whistle warning before entering 
the intersection during a snowstorm. 
Not less than 50 seconds would necessarily have 
expired between the time of the whistle and the col-
lision. At the time of the whistle, Respondent would 
have been one and one half blocks away from the 
intersection. So that a whistle so sounded would 
not have been "before entering the intersection" nor 
a warning to motorists of the approach of the loco-
motive to the intersection. 
Mr. Bond's conflicting testimony merely raised 
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a factual question \vhich it \Yas proper to submit to 
the jury, as the trial court did in Questions 3 and Ll·; 
and the jury could well find, as it did, that the failure 
to give the required statutory warning was the proxi-
mate cause of the collision. 
(2) 
The record indicates that the crossing watch-
man's shack is 43 feet south of the south curb line 
CR. p. 53, Ex. A.); that the crossing watchman, Mr. 
Walters was also obliged to discharge the duties of a 
switchman on this occasion CR. p. 260, 262) ; that 
after giving the locomotive engineer the proceed or 
high-ball signal when the locomotive was some two 
thirds of a block up the street and standing still 
CR. p. 259, 260), he observed Mr. Bond inspect or 
check the switch at the locomotive, and being in 
doubt as to whether he, Mr. Walters, had properly 
lined the switches for the approach of the locomotive 
to the station, (R. 277) he returned to the watch-
man's shack, set down his lantern, and proceeded to 
telephone the stationmaster (R. 261, 278) and in-
quired as to which track it was intended for the loco-
motive to travel upon (R. 262, 279). 
When he finished this conversation, he picked 
up his lantern, turned it on (R. 266) and stepped 
outside of the shack. He observed the Lodder car 
approaching (R. 264, 280, 281) and walked toward 
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the intersection swinging his lantern to warn of the 
approach of the locomotive (R. 282). Upon receiving 
the proceed signal from Walters, Mr. White waited 
one or two seconds and then received the go ahead 
signal from Mr. Bond. ( R.208) The locomotive then 
proceeded at either five or six, or seven or eight miles 
per hour without further stopping and without sound-
ing the whistle right up to the point of the collision. 
(R. 212, 213) This was a distance of approximately 
300 feet. (R. 212, 213) It would have taken alto-
gether less than one minute. During this interval 
Walters observed the movement, turned and entered 
his shack, telephoned the stationmaster, explained his 
problem, got his answer, picked up his lantern, 
turned it on, and then began to signal to warn of the 
approach of the locomotive by walking toward the 
middle of the street which was 89% feet away CR. 
282) and was still walking toward the middle of the 
street when the collision occurred (R. 283). 
The plaintiff and her husband both testified that 
there was no watchman in the intersection, no warn-
ing given, and that had he been there or had the 
warning been given, they would have seen it. {R. 70, 
153) Plaintiff did see a red light which was ap-
parently the watchman's lantern when it was sta-
tionary off at the south side of the road by the watch-
man's shack, and formed the conclusion that it was 
a warning of an excavation. (R. 158) 
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It is subn1itted that iu view of the forl'going phy-
sical facts of tin1e aud space plus the testimony of the 
plaintiff and her husband, coupled with the evasive 
and inconsistent testimony of Mr. Walters (R. 282), 
the jury could well conclude as it did, that "the 
watchman or flagman negligently failed to be 
stationed in the intersection or that he negligently 
fialed to signal the plaintiff or the driver of her 
car that a locomotive was approaching the in-
tersection," and that "such negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the injuries ... suffered by plaintiff." 
(3) 
Appellants next contend that notwithstanding 
the foregoing evidence of unlawful and negligent 
misconduct on the part of the railroad and its servants, 
nevertheless the sole proximate cause of the collision 
was the alleged negligence of Mr. Lodder, the driver 
of the car. This contention is not only clearly at 
variance with the facts, but is squarely refuted by 
the findings of the jury. (R. 353: Questions No. 3, 
4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.) 
With considerable disregard for the record, Ap-
pellants state at p. 19 of their brief that "The uncon-
troverted evidence establishes that the driver of the 
automobile ... approached the crossing at an un-
lawful and negligent rate of speed." This unjustified 
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conclusion is apparently predicated not upon any evi-
dence of speed or failure of the Lodders to keep a 
lookout, but solely upon the fact that when Mr. Lod-
der was suddenly confronted by the appearance of 
the locomotive as it came from behind the buildings 
which obstructed his view, he was required to apply 
his brakes suddenly and violently so that his car 
skidded on the ice. The argument completely neg-
lects the fact that had the defendants given a reason-
able warning, the car would have been braked and 
slo,Yed gradually so as to have stopped in a reason-
able distance and prior to entering upon the tracks. 
Indicative of this fallacious analysis of the facts 
is Appellants' unwarranted assertion that "it (the 
car) did not stop even when it struck the locomotive. 
It continued in another direction for an additional 
distance of 36 feet." The clear fact is that the car 
struck the locomotive with so little force that it did 
not rebound or careen away, but stopped and was 
then dragged by the locomotive alongside the track 
36 feet and that the locomotive thereafter proceeded 
an additional distance of some 27 feet before it 
itopped ( R. 196, 252). 
Appellants also make the unwarranted claim 
(Br. p. 19) that the car slid on the snow arid ice a 
distance of 60 feet before "crashing" into the locomo-
tive, whereas in fact the officer's measurement shows 
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only 45 feet of sliding if 15 feet is properly deducted 
for the length of the car (R. 252). 
Mr. Lodder testified that because of the snow-
storm he had put on his chains (R. 63); that he had 
come to a full stop only one block before this inter-
section (R. 65); that he had his windshield wipers 
in good working condition and his lights burning 
CR. 64); that he and his wife were not talking nor 
was the radio going ( R. 69 64) ; that he was keeping 
a careful lookout and also listening for an audible 
warning (R. 69, 87, 88); that the windshield was 
clear CR. 69); that the maximum speed attained be-
tween 3rd west and 4th west (the intersection of the 
tracks) was 15 miles per hour (R. 65); that as he 
approached the tracks he took his foot off the accel-
erator to more or less coast to the crossing (R. 69); 
that he was within four or five car lengths from the 
tracks when he first had any warning of the ap-
proach of the locomotive and that was by observing 
its black end suddenly loom up from behind the 
building at the north-east corner of the crossing 
CR. 69); that he immediately tried to get away from 
the train, but that because it came from behind the 
buildings without any warning,he did not have time 
to turn or stop before it was upon him CR. 70); that 
notwithstanding he was required to suddenly bring 
his car to a stop, he managed to slow down to two to 
five miles per hour before the collision CR. 73); that 
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his wife, the plaintiff, saw the locomotive only a 
second after he did and warned that they were going 
to hit, but it was already too late to do anything 
about it (R. 92, 93). 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Lodder, testified that though 
it was snowing, -the car had been equipped with 
chains (R. 150); that the car was not going over 15 
miles per hour (R. 152); that she knew her husband 
was a careful and competent driver (R. 151); that 
the defrosters and windshield wipers were working 
(R. 152); that she had her eyes on the road and was 
watching the crossing CR. 153); that though she 
was looking and listening she saw no signals and 
heard no warning (R. 153); that there were other 
automobiles parked along the north curb just prior 
to the intersection which partially obstructed the 
view (R. 154); that the "big red beer joint" on the 
northeast corner of the intersection also obstructed 
the view (R. 155); that she first sensed danger when 
she saw a big black "mountain" of darkness moving 
from behind the building and immediately warned 
her husband by crying out, "We're going to hit, 
aren't we?" (R. 156); that when the train was first 
visible to her, their car was too close to the tracks 
to do anything (R. 170); that her husband had 
shifted into second gear a split second before she was 
able to warn him (R. 171); that she was not con-
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scious of the car sliding, but only of the train coming 
toward her before the collision ( R. 172). 
With regard to the crossing watchman, plaintiff 
and her husband testified that they were familiar 
with the crossing and had crossed it many times 
(R. 66, 150); that they knew that generally when a 
train approached this particular intersection a watch-
man would come out with a sign in the daytime or a 
lantern at night (R. 66, 150); that when the watch-
man was off duty, the cover was removed' from a 
sign on the cross arm so that it stated, "Watchman 
Off Duty" (R. 67, 68); that at the time of the acci-
dent, the sign was covered so as to indicate that the 
watchman was on duty ( R. 100) ; that although they 
were looking for a watchman at the crossing, they 
saw none and received no signal from a watchman 
<R. 88, 153); that Plaintiff saw a red light over toward 
the watchman's shack, off to the side of the road, 
that the light was not moving, and that it was appar-
ently protecting an excavation (R. 158). 
Quite to the contrary of Appellants' unreason-
able assertion that "Had it (the car) not struck an 
immovable object it would hav.e continued on its 
course indefinitely until its momentum was ex-
pended," ( Br. p. 19) this testimony plus the physical 
facts clearly demonstrate that Mr. Lodder slowed 
the car from some ten or twelve miles per hour down 
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to a speed of two to five miles per hour within a 
distance of forty-five feet. There can be little ques-
tion but that had he received the warning to which 
he was entitled either from the locomotive whistle 
or from the crossing watchman, he would have 
brought his car to a safe stop before reaching the 
tracks. And Mr. Ladder's testimony as to this ma-
terial reduction in speed is corroborated by the phy-
sical facts that the car did not rebound or careen off 
from the locomotive, did not smash itself inextricably 
into the underpinnings of the locomotive, nor damage 
the locomotive other than by slightly bending the 
stirrup at the point of impact. (R. 196, 93, Ex. 2). 
Unlike any of the cases relied upon by Appel-
lants (Brief p. 20 to 34), it is clearly demonstrated 
that Mr. Lodder was conscious of the icy condition 
of the road, had attached his chains, slowed his 
speed, and was keeping a sharp lookout, and that 
he acted promptly and reasonably to stop his car 
as soon as any warning was available. The trial 
court and jury could not conclude otherwise than 
that the whistle warning required by law, or the 
signal warning required by the railroad and its 
watchman by reason of the practice voluntarily es-
tablished by them, would have been promptly acted 
upon by Mr. Lodder so that he would have braked 
his car to a gradual and safe stop. It is not only 
possiple (Br. p. 22) butinescapable that the warnings 
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or either of then1 '\yould have enabled the driver to 
stop before the collision." 
Respondent sincerely subn1its that in the light 
of the foregoing evidence a legal decision holding 
that plaintiff and her husband approached this inter-
section in such a manner as to be guilty of negligence 
as a matter of la'v which constituted the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision, would be tantamount to 
a ruling that all motorists must either approach and 
cross railroad tracks within the city strictly at their 
own peril notwithstanding the railroad unlawfully 
and negligently fails to give the required warning, 
or alternatively turn around at such crossings and 
return home to legal safety. 
* * * * * 
At this point in their Brief (Br. p. 20 to 34) 
Appellants cite and rely upon a series of cases some 
of which by quotation out of context appear on the 
surface to support their contention as to sole proxi-
mate cause. For the assistance of the Court, Re-
spondent submits the following analysis of those cases. 
In Lynch v. Pa. R. Co., 48 Ohio App. 295, 194 
N. E. 31, the driver went 25 to 30 miles per hour on 
an extremely slippery oiled road toward a railroad 
intersection at which visibility was unimpaired. He 
made no attempt to stop·until he was within 25 feet 
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of the crossing and was then unable to stop because of 
the condition of the street. There was no question as 
to the adequacy of the warning supplied by the rail-
road, and the court concluded that such conduct was 
"sheer madness." Quite the contrary of the instant 
case, there was nothing in the cited case which would 
have warranted the court or jury in believing that 
further warning from the railroad would have in-
duced the driver to earlier apply his brakes. 
In Lavallee v. Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 89 
N. H. 323, 197 A. 816, (Br. 23) the case goes off on 
the same basis as the Lynch case, to wit, the statutory 
warning would not have been effective to induce the 
driver to sooner slacken his speed or stop his truck. 
This conclusion was inescapable from the peculiar 
facts of the case, namely, that the truck was 350 
feet from the crossing when the train was at the 
whistle post, the truck was then at least 216 feet 
the other side of a crest in the road which obscured 
the visibility of the crossing, and "it could not rea-
sonably be inferred (from these facts) that if the 
truck driver had then heard a whistle he would at 
once have stopped his truck in order to avoid a col-
lision with a train, which was then invisible upon a 
crossing approximately 350 feet away." We submit 
that the evidence in the instant case indicates that 
had he been given the timely warning required of 
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the defendants, Mr. Ladder would have at once com-
menet'd to stop his car. 
The facts in the case of Umlauft v. C.M. & St. 
P.R. R., 233 \'Vis. 291, 289 N. W. 623, (Br. p. 25-27) 
are in no \Yay parallel to the facts of the instant case. 
There the driver approached the crossing at 25 to 30 
m.p.h. instead of 10 to 15 m.p.h., he had clear visi-
bility of ++2 feet at a distance· of 100 feet from the 
track, there was no claim of unlawful or negligent 
failure to warn of the locomotive's approach, the 
driver proceeded to within 7 5 feet before applying his 
brakes notwithstanding the icy condition of the road 
and the clear view of the train which was moving at 
40 m.p.h., there was no evidence that the driver 
slackened his speed before the impact, and the only 
claim of negligence was that if the train had been 
going at 1-5 m.p.h. as required by law, the car would 
have slid across the track in front of the train fnstead 
of hitting the second car. The excessive speed of the 
train was held not to have been the cause of the 
accident since it was entirely speculative whether 
under these circumstances the train would not have 
struck the car had the train been proceeding at only 
1 S m.p.h. as required by law. 
Davis v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co. 241 Mich. 166, 
216 N.W. 424 (Br. p. 21) relies on the case of Balti-
more and Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 
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S. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed. 167, which announced the strict 
rule of getting out of the car and going forward to 
view the tracks, which case was abrogated by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Pokora v. 
Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 54 S. Ct. 580, 78 
L. Ed. 1149. The Pokora case was cited with ap-
proval by the Utah Supreme Court in Toomer's Exec-
utor v. Union Pac. R. Co. Utah , 239 P. 2d 163. 
In Carlin v. Thompson, 234 Iowa 469, 12 N. W. 
2d 224, (Br. p. 21) the driver had 300 feet of visi-
bility, travelled at 45-50 miles per hour, and there 
was no issue of failure to give reasonable warning of 
the approach of the train. Here, again, the driver 
approached the crossing at an unreasonable rate of 
speed without in any way being so induced by the 
negligence of the railroad in failing to warn of the 
approach of the train. In the instant case, the Lod-
ders were going only 15 m.p.h. and would not have 
been going that fast had they received any due warn-
ing from the defendants. 
This was substantially the situation in Boyle v. 
Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 150 Pa. Super, 86, 27 A. 
2d 682, (Br. p. 21) where the driver had 480 feet of 
visibility, travelled at 35 miles per hour, failed to 
slow until he was 25-30 feet from the tracks, and the 
train was in plain view. 
The next three cases relied on by Appellants (Br. 
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27-3:2) are properly distinguishable on the ground 
that in each of these cases the court properly found 
that had a tin1ely 'varning been given it would not 
have been acted upon by the driver of the car in time 
to have avoided the collision because either he was 
unaware of the slippery condition of the road, or 
came upon the slippery portion unexpectedly. This 
is the point of distinction ·which Judge Ellett pointed 
out at p. 30 7 of the record. 
The following quotation from Barrett v. U.S. R. 
Ad1nin., 196 Iowa 1143, 194 N. W. 222, clearly indi-
cates the basis for these decisions: 
"As plaintiff approached the side track 
crossing, she had the train and its schedule in 
mind and reduced the speed of her auto for 
that reason, so that she had it apparently in 
perfect control. It would have been a perfect 
control were it not for the icy condition of 
the ground at that place and her ignorance 
thereof. She had no intention of crossing the 
main line without first looking to the west for 
a train. She had all the time a clear view of 
the eastand knew that no train was approach-
ing from that direction. She did look to the 
west immediately and did discover the train. 
She was 40 feet away and mentally ready to 
stop her car. The icy surface and the skidding 
of the car were conditions which she had not 
forseen or contemplated. These were the con-
ditions which exposed her to the collision ... " 
". . . The most that can be said is that if 
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she had heard the signals, she would have come 
to an earlier stop when she was farther away. 
Can we assume, or could the jury assume, that 
if the signals had been given, she would hav~ 
stopped her car farther away than 40 feet? 
Why should she do so? , If conditions had been 
in fact as she supposed them to be, she could, 
readily, and would have, stopped her car after 
crossing the side track. Would it have been 
less prudent for her to stop her car 40 feet 
away from the track than to stop it 60 or 80 
feet away therefrom? ... An automobile, 
stopped 30 or 40 feet away is as safe under 
ordinary conditions as if stopped 100 feet 
away ... " 
Hickey v. Missouri Pac. Railroad Corp. 8 F. 2d 
128; and Stroud v. Chicago M. St. P. Ry. Co. 75 Mont. 
384, 243 P. 1089, both of which are quoted out of con-
text by the defendants, involve fact situations similar 
to the Barrett case heretofore discussed, and both 
rely upon the Barrett case as their authority. 
Appellants' reference (Br. p. 29) to the Stroud 
case gives an unfair interpretation of the facts in that 
it is implied that the entire highway was covered by 
ice, whereas the court found that "the proximate 
cause of the collision was the icy and slippery con-
dition of the planking on the crossing." The driver 
was found not to be chargeable with knowledge of 
this condition. The court found that the failure to 
give the crossing signals in no way influenced plain-
tiff's actions in view of this circumstance. 
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The defendants' reliance upon llaarstrich v. 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 70 U. 5:32, 26~ P. 
100 (Br. p. 32) involves a total1uisconception of the 
problem involved herein. 
In the llaarstrich case, the driver had clear 
vision for 900 feet. The car \Yas traveling 25-30 miles 
per hour. It could have been stopped in 40 feet. The 
train was on the crossing when the car was 210 feet 
a\Yay, and there was no reason the driver couldn't 
have seen it had he looked. How can such a set of 
facts be decisive of the instant case when no sufficient 
warning vvas given to apprise the automobile of the 
presence of the train which suddenly loomed from 
behind the building? Obviously, it is not, nor are 
any of the other Utah cases cited and relied on by 
the defendants decisive of the present case. 
Olson v. D & R. G. W. R. Co. 98 U. 208, 98 P.2d 
944, involving a caboose with lights on blocking a 
·street, succinctly sets forth the basis for the rule of 
that case and the Haarstrich case in the following 
language. 
" ... the actual presence of a train on a 
crossing is notice and warning to motorists 
regardless of the absence or presence of other 
warning signs or signals. . . " 
By no stretch ·of the facts in the instant case can 
it be said that the offending locomotive was on the 
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crossing as notice to anyone. The evidence is to the 
contrary that it was not visible until too late to avoid 
the collision. 
Hansen v. Clyde, Utah , 56 P. 2d 1366; 
O'Brien v. Alson 61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791; Davis v. 
Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 P. 920, involved highway 
barricades, again obvious hazards visible in the road 
ahead. 
The difference between the line of Utah cases up-
on which defendants rely where the object obstructs 
the highway ahead and its presence there is notice, 
and the present case where the obstacle suddenly 
looms up from the side of the highway is set forth by 
Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion in 
Hickman v. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah) 213 P. 2d 
650, and constitutes a complete answer to the defend-
ants on this point. 
The cited line of Utah cases is also distinguished 
in Earle v. S. L. and U. R. Corp., 109 Utah 111, 165 
P. 2d 877. This is a case where the railroad failed to 
sound its whistle until it was too late for the ap-
proaching motorist to stop. His only warning, as 
here, was his view of the. train as it bore down upon 
him. 
The balance of the Utah cases cited by Appel-
lants (Br. p. 33) are quite obviously without bearing 
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on the present case. They are not helpful to the 
Court and require no further consideration. 
Ahnost the exact problem presented by the case 
at bar was presented to the court in Saeugling v. 
Scandrett 230 Iowa 153, 296 N. W. 787. The Court 
distinguished that case factually from the Barrett v. 
United States Railroad Administration case, 196 Iowa 
1143, 194 N. W. 222, a case which was decided by the 
same court, as \vell as the Hickey v. Missouri Pacific 
R. Corp. case, 8 F. 2d 128, on the grounds on which 
those cases have been heretofore distinguished in this 
brief. Because the case is so parallel, and because it 
also lays at rest the authorities relied on by the de-
fendants in this case, by illustrating wherein they are 
distinguishable, we take the liberty of quoting exten-
sively from the case: 
"Appellant relies upon Barrett v. United 
States R. Administration, 196 Iowa 1143, 194 
N.W. 222, and Pifer v. Chicago, M. St. P. & 
P. R. Co., 215 Iowa 1258, 247 N.W. 625. An 
examination of these cases distinguishes them 
from the one before us. In the Barrett case, 
the plaintiff applied her brakes within about 
40 feet of the intersection. With her car in 
the condition that it was, she could have 
stopped in time to have avoided the train, but 
for an icy stretch of which she was not aware. 
"It appears, therefore, or at least the jury 
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could have found that as she proceeded to the 
crossing her reliance was in the brakes of her 
car and not upon any signals. She knew that 
a train was due to approach at about that time. 
Her injury resulted from lack of knowledge 
of the condition of the street. Acting on the 
assurance that she could stop, she continued to 
the point where she first saw the train and 
then met with injuries she would not have sus-
tained but for the icy pavement. 
''In that case, as in this, the view of the 
approaching train was obscured to within 40 
feet of the track. 
"In the Pifer case, the plaintiff was fa-
miliar with the crossing and anticipated that a 
train might be along at that time and he in-
tended to stop and reconnoiter before crossing 
the track. His expectation of stopping and 
looking was frustrated by loose gravel, the 
presence of which he was unaware. When he 
applied his brakes, his auto slid into the train. 
The Federal case which appellant cites, Hickey 
v. Missouri Pac. Corp., 8 Cir., 8 F. 2d 128, is 
very much like the Barrett case and is not 
controlling. 
"To sum the matter up, we have the 
plaintiff and her associates approaching a well-
known crossing on a pavement which they 
knew would be icy and slippery. They knew 
as they neared the track that a train was due 
at any moment. They had the car window 
down to permit the hearing of signals but they 
heard none. The windshield was clear of frost 
but because of the obstruction they did not see 
the train until within 40 feet of the track. 
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'"Under these circurnstances, we do not 
feel that we should substitute our judgn1cnt for 
that of the jury on the fact question whether 
had the signals been given they would have 
been heard, and being heard, whether the 
automobile would have been stopped out of the 
zone of danger. They had a right to assume, 
until they had knowledge or notice to the con-
trary, that the signals required by Code, sec-
tion 8018 would be given by the train crew. 
'Vhat has been said makes it unnecessary that 
\Ve should analyze appellee's citations. Agree-
ing with the trial court, that this is pr«;>perly 
a case for the jury, its judgment is affirmed." 
In Leavell v. Thompson, (Mo.) 176 S.W. 2d 
854, the court had before it a fact situation very simi-
lar to the one at bar. The streets were covered with 
snow and ice and were slick; the view was obstructed 
until within 50 feet of the crossing. The train failed 
to give any warning of its approach and when plain-
tiff discovered the train he applied his brakes. The 
car skidded onto the railroad tracks. Said the court: 
"We think that defendant's failure to 
warn plaintiff of the approach of the train 
contributed to the collision as, at least, one of 
the proximate causes thereof. Plaintiff knew 
that the road was icy and slick and was listen-
ing intently for the approach of the train, 
which he knew was due, as he passed along 
the obstruction that prevented his seeing its 
approach. The jury could have reasonably 
inferred that a sudden blast of the whistle 
would have been heard, heeded and acted 
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upon by plaintiff at that time. (citations) Or-
dinarily, the question of proximate cause is 
one for the jury (citation), and in this case we 
think it was a question for the jury to deter-
mine whether the failure of the defendant's 
agents to give a timely warning concurred at 
least as one of the proximate causes to bring 
about the collision. Williams v. Thompson, 
Mo. App. 166 S.W. 2d 785; Sisk v. Chicago 
B. & Q. R. Co., Mo. App., 67 S.W. 2d 830. 
" ... The evidence shows that the place 
where plaintiff's car skidded was not only 
slick but that there had been a large snow fall 
in the vicinity. There was, also, evidence that 
there was ice and snow on other roads in the 
vicinity. In fact it would be a freak of nature 
for ice and snow to be upon the road in ques-
tion between the end of the obstruction and 
the tracks and not appear anywhere else. The 
jury could have inferred that the operators of 
the train saw the general icy condition if it was 
not, as a matter of law, their duty to see it. 
(citation)" 
In Williams v. Thompson, 166 S.W. 2d 785, un-
der facts similar to those of the present case, that is, 
prevalence of ice on the streets, obstructed crossing, 
no signals given by the train, the car traveling 10-15 
miles per hour, the driver and other occupants of 
the car discovered the train and the driver applied 
the brakes but slid on the ice into the train. The rail-
road advanced the same argument as in the case at 
bar, the failure to give signals was not the proximate 
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cause of the accident but that the slippery condition 
of the highway was. The court said: 
" ... It is obvious that defendant, as well 
as plaintiff, was familiar with the snow and ice 
on the street and the slippery condition there-
of. Defendant well knew the hazards sur-
rounding the crossing in question and that the 
snow and icy condition increased the danger. 
It is evident that the snow and ice on the street 
played an important part in producing the 
accident. It is also true that plaintiff saw the 
approaching train in time to have stopped be-
fore going on the track had the pavement been 
free of ice an snow. But there is no merit in 
defendant's contention that the presence of 
snow and ice on the pavement was a new inter-
vening and efficient cause which broke all 
casual connection between its negligence in 
having failed to ring the bell or blow the 
whistle, and the accident. 
"Plaintiff and the other occupants of the 
automobile approached the crossing oblivious 
to the on-coming train which was hidden from 
their view by the obstructions heretofore men-
tioned,and were about half way down the hill. 
The evidence indicates that as soon as plaintiff 
saw the train (all occupants of the car saw it 
about the same time) the driver immediately 
tried to stop the automobile ... " 
The court then reviewed the testimony of the 
witnesses, none of which was as strong on the ques-
tion of reasonable care as that of plaintiff and her 
husband in the present case, and concluded that: 
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"It may be reasonably inferred from the 
foregoing that if defendant had given a warn-
ing, such as the facts and circumstances de-
manded, the driver of the automobile could 
and would have stopped on the level pavement 
that led up to the office west of the tracks and 
would not have reached a position of peril 
from which he could not extricate himself as 
the train approached. It cannot be said that 
the snow and ice upon the street was of itself, 
sufficient to cause the collision for if defendant 
had given a warning plaintiff would not have 
reached such position that the collision could 
not have been avoided. It seems clear that 
plaintiff was brought into her perilous position 
by defendant's negligence. In such situation 
an issue of fact is presented that should be 
solved by the triers of fact. (citation)." 
To like effect are the following cases: Jackson v. 
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 211 S.W. 2d 931; 
Hubbs v. Boston & M. R. R. 260 N.Y. 223, 183 N.E. 
370; and Sisk v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., <Mo.) 67 
s.w. 2d 831. 
It is submitted, that in this case as in the Toom-
er's Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Utah), 239 P. 2d 
163, the automobile had a right to proceed under the 
circumstances existing at the crossing, and that the 
case comes within the rule announced in Hudson v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., ____ Utah ____ , 233 P. 2d 357: 
"Defendant contends the sole proximate 
cause of the accident was the fact that the 
automobile stalled momentarily on the track 
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just before it was struck. However, a jury 
could reasonably find that the failure to give 
the warning signals, if such was found to be 
the fact, was a proximate cause of the collision. 
Nothing needs to be added to what was stated 
by this court regarding proximate cause in Earle v. 
Salt Lake and Utah Ry. Co. 109 Utah 111, 118, 165 
P. 2d 877, 881." 
Points II and Ill 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE VERDICT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT 
Appellants' Points II and III can better be con-
sidered together, for the reason that Point III is based 
upon and relies entirely upon a conclusion reached 
in Point II, which conclusion is not supported by the 
law or the facts. 
It is appellants' position (Brief, p. 39 and 45) 
that the special verdict "is fatally insufficient to 
support the judgment rendered." In this part of 
their brief appellants do not raise the question as to 
whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant or 
support the findings. 
Appellants' argument can be fairly separated 
and treated in five parts: 
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(1) 
The first complaint (Br. p. 38-41) is that no one 
single interrogatory asked the jury to find whether 
appellants failed to give "reasonable warning to 
motorists of the approach of the locomotive to the 
intersection." Appellants seem to recognize that 
Interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12 were 
submitted relative to this issue of warning and that 
answers favorable to respondent were elicited as to 
Questions 3, 4, 10, 11, and 12. Appellants argue that 
for the trial court to concludefrom these affirmative 
answers that appellants failed to give a "reasonable 
warning," would be an inference of fact, not of law, 
and would constitute an unwarranted finding of fact 
in support of the judgment. 
(a) 
Appellants erroneously contend that their only 
duty under the circumstances was to give what 
amounted to a reasonable warning. (Brief, page 39). 
In view of the facts as found that this locomo-
tive approached an intersection in Salt Lake City 
during a snow storm, the duty is not to give a reason-
able warning, but the duty is that prescribed ex-
pressly by statute. Section 77-0-14, U.C.A. 1943, as 
amended by Laws or 1943, page 124, provides in 
part as follows: 
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". . . During the prevalence of fogs, snow 
and dust storms, the locomotive whistle shall 
be sounderl before each street crossing while 
passing through cities and towns ... Every 
person in charge of a locomotive violating the 
provisions of this section is guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and the railroad company shall be 
liable for all damages which any person may 
sustain by reason of such violation." 
When the jury found that ( 1) ."in this case the 
locomotive involved in the collision was driven into 
the intersection of Second South Street with Fourth 
West Street during the prevalence of a snow storm 
without the whistle thereon being sounded just prior 
to the entrance of the locomotive into the said inter-
section" and (2) that "this failure to sound the 
whistle was a proximate cause of the injuries ... 
sustained by the plaintiff," and ( 3) that neither 
plaintiff nor the driver of the car was guilty of con-
tributory negligence, then there was nothing left 
for the trial judge to do but apply the law. There 
were no additional questions or issues of fact which 
it would have been proper to submit to the jury as 
to this matter. The test was not one of reasonable-
ness, but was a specific factual test supplied by the 
legislature. This is a matter of general statutory law, 
not of ordinance, and was not required to be pleaded. 
It was incumbent upon the trial judge to apply the 
law to the facts as found. On this basis the trial court 
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was obliged to find for plaintiff on the issue of 
liability. 
If the trial court had submitted an interroga-
tory (as suggested by appellants in their brief) as to 
whether appellants failed to give reasonable warning 
of the approach of the locomotive, we submit this 
would have been error in that it would have been 
the submission of an issue of law, not of fact. 
See: 53 Am. Jur. 756, Sections 1090, 1091; 64 
CJ 1166, Section 955. 
(b) 
Appellants contend that the findings with re-
spect to the watchman and his failure to signal, "fall 
far short of a finding that the defendants failed to 
give reasonable warning of the approach of the loco-
motive." (Brief page 41). 
It is not disputed that the appellant railroad had, 
prior to the accident, voluntarily assumed the duty 
of maintaining a crossing watchman or flagman at 
the intersection in question (R. p. 16 and 21, No. 10). 
It is also undisputed that the plaintiff and her hus-
band, the driver of the car, were aware of the practice 
of the railroad in maintaining a crossing watchman at 
this intersection, had come to rely upon this method 
of warning, and were misled into believing that no 
train was approaching at the time of the collision 
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by reason of the failure of the watchman to be sta-
tioned in the intersection and to give timely warning 
of the approaching locomotive. (R. p. 66-68, 150-
151, 153, 172) 
In view of this circumstance, the duty was not 
merely to give a "reasonable warning." The duty 
was that assumed by the appellant railroad-namely, 
to give timely warning of the approach of a loco-
motive to the intersection through the medium of 
the crossing watchman or flagman. Any warning 
short of this warning would not, as a matter of law, 
be a reasonable warning. Therefore, the court pro-
perly elicited a finding of an ultimate fact by its 
Interrogatories No. 10 and 11. In response to these 
questions the jury found "that there was a watchman 
or flagman on duty at the intersection and at the time 
of the collision" and that "the watchman or flagman 
negligently failed to be stationed in the intersec-
tion or that he negligently failed to signal the plain-
tiff or the driver of her car that a locomotive was 
approaching." 
In view of these answers to Questions No. 10 
and 11, plus the uncontroverted evidence as to 
plaintiff's knowledge of and reliance upon the watch-
man or flagman, the trial court had no alternative 
but to find the issue of negligence against appellants, 
as a matter of law~ 
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As stated at 7 4 C.J .S. 1354 (Section 728) : 
"Where a flagman is employed or a gate 
established, the person in charge is bound to 
perform his duties with reasonable care and 
prudence, and a failure to do so is negligence 
for which the railroad company is liable. It 
is negligence for a gate keeper or flagman to 
leave his post, knowing that an engine is 
approaching, without giving some signal of 
danger ... " 
See to the same effect: 44 Am. Jur. 771, Sec-
tions 526 and 527, Restatement of Torts, Section 301, 
Comment (f); 71 ALR 1160 at 1177, Bluhm v. Bryan, 
193 Wis. 346, 214 N W364. 
Respondents concede, however, that in view of 
the findings that the bell on the locomotive was rung 
and that the light on the south end of the locomotive 
was burning prior to the collision, it might have been 
error for the trial court to conclude, as a matter of 
law, that the failure of the watchman to give timely 
warning was the proximate cause of the collision and 
of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The trial 
court did not make this mistake of passing on proxi-
mate cause, but specifically asked the jury, in Ques-
tion No. 12: 
"Do you find "Qy a preponderance of the 
evidence that such negligencee (failure of the 
watchman to be stationed in the intersection 
or to signal) was a proximate cause of the 
injuries?" 
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To \Yhich the jury answ£'red, "Yes." 
Appellants do not con1plain that there were in-
sufficient facts to '"arrant subrnitting the issue of 
proximate cause to the jury. No doubt the fact that 
the bell ''"as at the north end of a 120-foot unit (R. 
p. 183, 185), \Yas separated from the street by inter-
vening buildings, and that the small light on the south 
end of the locomotive was not seen by respondents 
but \Yas diffused in an intersection which was thor-
oughly lighted by t\vo sodium lamps. (R. pp. 54 to 
56), and was also obscured by an extension on the 
end of the locomotive (R. 218), warranted the court in 
believing that the jury question as to proximation did, 
in fact, exist. 
(2) 
Appellants further complain of the insufficiency 
of the special verdict (Br. p. 42) on the ground that 
Question No. 7 falls short of being a finding that 
"the trainmen negligently failed to keep a reasonable 
lookout for plaintiff's automobile as the locomotive 
approached the intersection." The actual language 
of the question is whether "the train men on the 
locomotive negligently failed to keep a lookout for 
automobiles crossing the intersection." This question 
was answered, "Yes." 
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Appellants' point seems to be that the duty was 
to watch out for automobiles "approaching" the in-
tersection, not for automobiles "crossing" the inter-
section. This would seem to be strictly a point with-
out a prick. No jury could be expected to take so 
narrow a view of the question. 
As stated at 64 CJ 1185 (Sec. 974): 
"A special verdict, finding or answer is 
to be construed liberally with a view of ascer-
taining the intention of the jury. . . It must 
be borne in mind that the jury may employ 
a term in its common rather than its techni-
cally correct sense; and the findings should be 
held to have the meaning that the average 
juror would understand them to have." 
Particularly when Question 7 is read together 
with Question 8, it is evident that the finding is in 
substance that the trainman failed to keep "the look-
out of reasonable prudent persons under the circum-
stance." 
"A special verdict, finding or answer is to 
be construed as a whole, and where there are 
two or more answers or findings, they are to 
be construed together. Also, all the special 
issues submitted to the jury for answers must 
be considered together as a whole." (64 CJ, 
Sec. 975.) 
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(3) 
Appellants further contend that Finding No. 8 
does not establish that the train crew had a clear-cut 
opportunity to stop the locomotive or give the signal 
in time to enable the plaintiff to stop the automobile 
and thus avoid the collision. (Brief, p. 43) 
No complaint is n1ade by appellants in this sec-
tion of their brief that the facts do not warrant the 
submission of Question No. 8 to the jury. 
'Ve submit that Question 8 and the affirmative 
answer, particularly when read together with Ques-
tion 7, is a specific finding that the train crew did 
have a clear opportunity to stop or signal so as to 
avoid the collision. 
Apparently the real basis of the attack upon this 
portion of the verdict is that the facts do not warrant 
the submission of Question 8 to the jury, since there 
is no evidence from which the jury could find that 
the hostler was made or could have been made aware 
of the approach of the automobile sufficiently early 
to sound a warning whistle which would have been 
"a benefit to either the driver or the plaintiff." 
The blowing of the whistle "after it was ap-
parent to the trainmen or should have been apparent 
to a reasonable prudent person that the driver of the 
automobile was not going to stop his automobile be-
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fore driving into the path of the locomotive" is not as 
appellants would lead the Court to believe, the same 
thing as a question whether the whistle could have 
been blown "after the train crew saw the peril of the 
auton1obile" and "it was much too late to afford any 
benefit to either the driver or the plaintiff." (Brief, 
p. 44) 
Under the evidence which went to the jury (R. 
p. 233) the jury could have concluded that Mr. 
White, the hostler, was given a signal when the 
automobile was 200 feet east of the tracks. A whistle 
signal at that point might very well have been suffi-
cient to give the driver timely warning of the ap-
proach of the locomotive so that he could have 
brought his car to a slow and gradual stop, notwith-
standing the presence of the ice. 
(4) 
It will be evident to the Court from the fore-
going that Respondent contends and represents that 
the special verdict was, in all particulars, sufficient 
as a matter of fact to support the judgment rendered. 
Respondent believes she has demonstrated the follow-
ing: 
( 1) The answers to Question 3, 4, 10, 11, and 
12 establish that defendants failed, as a matter of 
fact, to give the whistle warning of the approach of 
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the locmnotive to the crossing 'vhich was required by 
the statute, in the one instance, and the flagman 
warning which was required by the voluntarily 
adopted practice of the defendants, in the other 
instance. 
r,7-Jl\1J 
( 2) That the answers to Questions 8 and 9 es-
tablish that the trainmen failed to keep the lookout 
of a reasonable, prudent persons under the circum-
stances. 
(3) That the answers to Questions 8 and 9 
further established that the trainmen failed to exer-
cise reasonable care to avoid the collision by giving 
a tirnely whistle warning after a reasonable lookout 
did disclose to them that the automobile was 200 feet 
east of the track and when such a warning would 
have permitted the driver to bring his"· car to a 
gradual and safe stop short of the tracks. 
( 4) That the answers to Questions 8 and 9 
established that the trainmen failed to exercise rea-
sonable care by stopping the locomotive in time to 
avoid the collision. 
( 5) That the answers to Questions +, 9, and 12 
establish that the foregoing negligence of the train-
nlen was the proximate cause of the collision and of 
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. 
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It is evident therefore, that the trial court was 
not obliged to imply any findings of fact to support 
the judgment. Hence, the argument of appellants' 
Point III, to the effect that "no finding in support of 
the judgment can be i1nplied," is beside the point and 
raises an issue of law which has no applicability in 
this case. 
However, the Court may be interested in an 
analysis of Rule 49 (a) and of appellants interpretation 
and application thereof as developed on pages 48 and 
49 of their Brief, wherein certain Texas authorities 
are cited and relied upon. 
The Texas cases have reference to entire omitted 
issues and separate defenses rather than to additional 
findings which may be a part of and related to 
existing issues or defenses. The correct application of 
URCP 49 (a) is to be found in the case of Hinshaw 
vs. New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
104 Fed. 2d 45, in which case Federal Civil Rule 
49 (a) was construed to mean exactly what it says: 
"If ... the court omits any issue of fact 
raised by the pleadings or evidence, each party 
waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue 
so omitted unless before the jury retires he de-
mands its submission to the jury. As to an 
issue omitted without such demand, the court 
may make a finding, or if it fails to do so, it 
shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special 
verdict.'' 
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Respondent sub1nits that a Texas decision 111ore 
helpful and n1ore pertinent is the case of'Panhandle 
and S. R. Ry. Co. z:s. Friend <.Tex.), 91 S\V 2d, 922. 
In that case the court ruled that 
" ... where issues are subn1itted which are 
clearly referrable to a specific ground of re-
covery, it is the manifest purpose of the statute 
that on1issions in the charge will be supplied 
by presumptioon of finding, when there is 
supporting evidence." 
Appellants refer at page 45 of their Brief to Sec-
tion 104-25-1, UCA 1943, which defines a special ver-
dict in a manner which apparently they claim is 
favorable to them. This section was superseded Jan-
uary 1, 1950, by Rule 49 URCP (see U.R.C.P. Table I, 
p. 183, and Table III, p. 18), and thus the statute 
could have neither controlling nor persuasive effect 
herein. Rule 49 gives complete support to respond-
ent's postion. If appellants must rely on Section 104-
25-1 to sustain their position, then that position is nec-
essarily without merit. 
(5) 
Appellants finally complain (Brief, pp. 50-51) 
that (a) the trial court submitted a special verdict 
to the jury without the parties having requested such 
a procedure; (b) appellants were not given "any 
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notice" of the court's intention to so instruct; and 
(c) appellants were not given any opportunity to 
prepare requests for submission to the jury "covering 
any special issues." 
(a) 
Rule 49 (a) does not require that the special 
verdict be used only when invoked by counsel. Quite 
to the contrary, it expressly provides that "the court" 
Inay submit written interrogatories and may require 
a special verdict. 
(b) 
The record plainly shows <R. 307-8) that appel-
lants were given notice of the trial court's intention 
to submit special interrogatories; that both Mr. Jen-
son and Mr. Bagley did, in fact, make suggestions as 
to the content of the interrogatories; that appellants 
suggested that a question be submitted to the jury 
which would permit a finding as to whether Mr. 
Ladder's alleged negligent driving and the icy condi-
tion of the street were the sole proximate cause of the 
accident; that the trial court quite properly ruled 
that this suggestion would add nothing to the pro-
posed interrogatories, since Questions 13, 14 and 15 
squarely tested the jury's conclusions on this very 
issue. Since the jury expressly found that Mr. Lod-
der did not drive the automobile "into the intersection 
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at a rate of speed that \Yas greater than \vas safe, 
reasonable, and prudent, having regard to all sur-
rounding circumstances then existing," or "without 
keeping the same lookout which a reasonably prudent 
person \vould have kept under the same circum-
stances then existing," it is extremely difficult to see 
how appellants could possibly be prejudiced if this 
\Yas the only suggestion they had for a further issue. 
Appellants made no further requests or sugges-
tions for interrogatories, excepting to remind the 
court that, in their opinion, there were no issues of 
fact whatsoever which should be submitted to the 
jury. This had already been covered by their request 
for directed verdict. Appellants did not ask for time 
or other opportunity to consider further the special 
verdict. 
Appellants' position throughout this case demon-
strates a thorough failure to distinguish the situation 
wherein the driver of an automobile, either not know-
ing of the ice or coming upon it at the last minute, 
would not have slowed earlier had he been timely 
warned, as against the situation here presented, 
where the driver knew he was on ice, was driving 
with regard for this very circumstance, and would 
have commenced to brake and slow earlier and with 
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adequate gradualness had he received the timely 
warning which the railroad and its employees were 
obliged to give. It is evident that the trial court 
perceived this very distinction at this point in the 
case, for, at page 307 of the Record, he responds to 
counsel's suggestions for additional interrogatories 
by pointing out that the presence of the ice would be 
an intervening cause only where "ice is inserted sud-
denly when you are driving on a highway." 
Since the trial court not only submitted the 
proposed spec~al verdict to counsel for both parties 
but, beyond this, warned them as to the effect of their 
failure to make requests covering all issues (R. p. 
307) and then fully and frankly discuss~d the cover-
age of the proposed interrogatories with counsel, it 
can scarcely be error that appellants failed to suggest 
anything further of merit. This is hardly the situa-
tion which was presented in Pittsburg R. Co. vs. 
Smith, 207 Ill. 486, 69 NE 873, relied upon by 
appellants (Brief, p. 51,) as even a cursory reading of 
that case will demonstrate. 
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Point IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED ALL MATERIAL 
ISSUES AND INSTRUCTED ON THEM 
Appellants' contention under point IV of their 
brief is that the court erred in failing to submit to the 
jury the question of whether plaintiff was negligent, 
and whether her negligence, if any, contributed to 
the collision. The specific complaint is that the trial 
court failed to submit to the jury the issue of whether 
in the exercise of reasonable care the plaintiff should 
have protested against the alleged unreasonable and 
unlawful rate of speed at which her husband ap-
proached the tracks. 
The answer to this contention may best be 
divided into three par~s: 
(1) 
In answer to interrogatory No. 3, served by plain-
tiff on the defendant railroad, the railroad stated that 
the negligence of the plaintiff upon which they relied 
to defeat her claim was: 
"The plaintiff, Merlene Lodder failed to 
hear the bell and whistle warning of the ap-
proaching engine or failed to heed said warn-
ing and communicate the knowledge she had 
or should have had to the driver at a time 
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when the said warnings were clearly audible· 
plaintiff failed to look for or see or heed th~ 
approaching engine and communicate the 
knowledge she had or should have had to the 
driver so that he would slow up or stop his 
automobile at a time when the engine was 
plainly visible; plaintiff failed to maintain a 
proper lookout as she approached the railroad 
crossing and communicate timely warning to 
the driver of the automobile." 
No mention was ever made of a claimed issue of 
contributory negligence in failing to tell her husband 
to diminish an alleged unlawful rate of speed. There-
fore, this issue was not raised either by the pleadings 
or the answers to the interrogatories. 
(2) 
Question No. 13, submitted the issue to the jury 
as to whether plaintiff's husband drove "at a rate of 
speed that was greater than safe, reasonable, and 
prudent, having regard to the surrounding circum-
stances." The jury by their answer indicated that 
he did not fail to exercise reasonable care in driving 
at the speed he did, and that he was not driving at an 
excessive speed. This being so, Appellants obviously 
cannot have been prejudiced by the court's failure to 
submit to the jury a question as to whether plaintiff 
should have protested the alleged driving at an 
excessive rate of speed. 
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(3) 
The general issues of Mr. Lodder's alleged neg-
ligence both as to excessive speed and failure to keep 
a lookout and plaintiff's alleged contributory negli-
gence \Yere submitted to the jury by questions 13, 
14, 1·5~ 16, 17 and 18. 
Although the proposed special verdict covering 
the issue of Plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence 
was submitted to counsel for Appellants before it was 
given to the jury, CR. 307) no objection was made on 
this point, nor did Appellants request a more specific 
interrogatory covering this aspect of Plaintiff's 
alleged contributory negligence. It is hardly an 
answer to this omission to complain that the trial 
court undertook to submit the "issue" on its own mo-
tion, but did so imperfectly. (Br. p. 55.) Rule 49(a) 
seems to contemplate that counsel have a duty to call 
such imperfections to the attention of the trial court 
or thereafter keep their peace. 
In view of the answers elicited to these questions, 
the trial court reasonably concluded that the jury 
in fact found plaintiff not guilty of contributory neg-
ligence in failing to protest against the alleged ex-
cessive speed of her husband's driving. If the jury 
concluded that the speed was reasonable it could 
hardly have believed she had any duty to complain 
or protest on this ground. Under Rule 49(a) the 
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trial court had every right to so conclude, and in the 
absence of Appellants' express objection to the in-
terrogatory as proposed, it must be presumed that the 
trial court did, in fact, imply this finding if it is neces-
sary as a matter of law to support the judgment. 
Point V 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE 
QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
Appellants contend that instruction No. 2 re-
lating to proximate cause, given by the the trial 
court and set out in Appellants' brief at p. 60 is an 
abstract definition of a legal concept which the trial 
court failed to apply to any of the facts of the case. 
This argument completely disregards and overlooks 
the special verdict procedure under which the case 
was submitted to the jury. 
The instruction has direct application to inter-
rogatories 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18, and the jury 
could scarcely have concluded otherwise. Rather 
than failing to connect it to any factual proposition, 
we submit that the court did an excellent job of set-
ting it forth so the jury could see its application to 
each of the interrogatories submitted to them. The 
definition of proximate cause is set forth, and was 
coupled with a series of interrogatories which set up 
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the application of the principle defined. Nothing 
could be clearer to the jury than this method of 
instructing them. 
Nor, do we read into the last sentence of the 
instruction the conflict with the balance of the in-
struction which appellants complain of. To the con-
trary, it appears to be very clear and explicit. 
As has been pointed out under point No. II of 
this brief, the jury found that Appellants' negligence 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries 
(Interrogatories 3 and 4, 7, 8 and 9, and 10, 11 and 
12). The jury also found that plaintiff's husband 
was not negligent in any particulars (Interrogatories 
13, 14 and 15) and that plaintiff herself was not 
negligent (Interrogatories 16, 17 and 18). These 
findings provide a complete answer to th~ balance 
of Appellants' argument (p. 63, 64) under their 
heading, Point V. 
Point VI 
THE ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WERE ALL 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Appellants contend that certain issues were sub-
mitted to the jury unsupported by the evidence. This 
is but a rehash of a part of their argument under 
point I of their brief. 
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The argument made refers to requested instruc-
tions No. 1 and 8, which were refused by the trial 
court. 
We have heretofore pointed out (see Point D 
wherein the issue of negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff's husband was properly submitted to the 
jury, which is the point raised by defendants' re-
quested instruction No. 1; and we have also pointed 
out (see Point I) wherein the evidence supported the 
submission to the jury of the issue of failure to keep 
a lookout on the part of the trainmen and negligent 
failure to stop the train. A claim to the contrary was 
the basis for defendants' requested instruction No. 8. 
We refer the court to Respondent's Point I for a dis-
cussion of the evidence in regard to these matters. 
Point VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANTS TO 
THE TIME LIMIT FOR CLOSING ARGUMENT WHICH 
THEY VOLUNTARILY AGREED UPON 
Appellants' Brief (p. 67) neglects to inform the 
Court that no time limit was "allotted" to or imposed 
upon them for closing argument, but that by volun-
tary agreement of all counsel, they undertook to 
confine their closing argument to 40 minutes to the 
side. 
I 
I 
I i I 
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It is ouly by reference to the Record ( p. 323-324) 
that it becornes clear that the tin1e lilnitations were 
self ilnposed by agreement of counsel.. 
The record also clearly shows that the trial 
cotu·t then \Yarned all counsel, that if they were to 
keep themselves within these time limits, they would 
have to reserve part of their time to argue the ques-
tion of damages if that became an issue as the result 
of a special verdict favorable to Plaintiff (R. 324). 
It is also clear from the record that when they argued 
the question of liability, Respondent's counsel saved 
some eight or nine minutes out of the forty agreed 
upon. Appellants' counsel voluntarily elected to 
consume their entire time in arguing the issue of 
liability and apparently made the decision that by 
so doing they could best present their case and pro-
tect their interests. As a matter of fact they con-
sumed not only their agreed forty minutes, but ex-
ceeded that in arguing the issue of liability. 
It was only when they were apparently sur-
prised by the jury's special verdict in favor of plain-
tiff, that defendant's counsel suddenly attempted to 
retrieve themselves from this error of strategy and 
created a situation in which the trial court was 
obliged in fairness to the agreement voluntarily 
reached, to insist that Appellants' counsel abide by 
their agreement. 
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This is not the situation presented in the cases 
cited by Appellants in their brief at page 68. In 
each of those cases the trial court imposed on counsel 
without their consent or approval, a time limit which 
was found to be unreasonable in view of the com-
plexity of the issues to be argued. 
The case cames closer to Ackerman v. Griggs, 
(Cal. App.) 293 P. 115, 117, where the appellant 
complained that the trial court refused to permit him 
to continue his argument beyond the one hour set 
aside for him, and the appellate court concluded that, 
"This is a mater wholly within the discretion of the 
trial judge." 
The following language from Bell v. Kelly, 73 
Cal. App. 189, 238 P. 719 is pertinent: 
"In addition to the claim that the dam-
ages are excessive, appellant contends that 
error was committed by the triaL court in re-
stricting the time for argument by counsel be-
fore the jury to 35 minutes for each party. 
The plaintiff and respondent was satisfied with 
this allotment of time, and it is a matter rest-
ing within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. We may not presume that a more 
lengthy argument upon the facts would have 
caused the jury to see them differently than it 
did." 
Incidentally, it is not quite fair to state (Brief p. 
66) that Respondent's counsel argued the matter of 
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damages ""at length." Since this point is raised, the 
Court should kno\Y that not n1ore than four n1inutes 
in all was consumed in the closing argurnent of 
Respondent on the issue of dan1ages, and that all in 
all, her time for argun1ent \Yas not fully used. 
Point VIII 
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DID NOT 
INDICATE PASSION, PREJUDICE, OR CORRUPTION 
The only fair and helpful approach to this issue 
is to compare the amount of the jury's verdict with 
the evidence which went to the jury on the issue of 
Plaintiff's bodily injuries. It is specious to approach 
the question of reasonableness of the damages by 
cmnparing the jury's verdict with the trial court's per-
sonal view of damages in a personal injury case. 
This basic fallacy in Appellants' position is per-
haps best demonstrated by three points, as follows: 
First: In the case of Falkenberg v. Neff, 72 Utah 
258, 269 P. 1008, this very Supreme Court reduced a 
jury award by 70% for excessiveness without finding 
passion and prejudice. Therefore to reason that 
because Judge Ellett reduced Mrs. Ladders verdict 
from $25,000 to $10,000, a matter of 60%, this Court 
must conclude from this fact alone that the verdict 
was a result of passion, etc., is to fly in the face of 
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both reason and precedent. (Appellants do not in-
clude the Falkenberg case in their table at page 71 
of their Brief.) 
Second: The results that would follow from 
such an inflexible and arbitrary ruling as that a 
remission of 60% is per se sufficient evidence of pas-
sion etc. to warrant reversal, demonstrate the hollow-
ness of the argument. Would any trial court here-
after in this jurisdiction ever express himself as to 
excessiveness of the verdict even though he were con-
vinced that a remission of 60% or more would work 
justice, and that there was in fact no prejudice 
evidenced by the verdict? Obviously not. In fact, 
the trial courts would be extremely cautious in con-
sidering remissions of any substantial proportion be-
cause of the danger of falling within the unfortunate 
doctrine of the Ladder case. Hence such benefit as 
our system of jurisprudence derives from this ac-
cepted practice would be very much impaired and 
limited. See Bennett vs. D.P. R. Co. (Utah), 213 P. 
2d 325. 
Third: If prejudice and passion is to be deter-
mined by comparing the jury's idea of damages 
against that of a single trial judge, (rather than 
against the evidence of injury), then we are actually 
substituting a judge's test as to what was fair in place 
of the jury's judgment as to what was fair. This is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
65 
the reasoning process Appellants would have the 
Court follow. Respondent subn1its it is a procedure 
which con1pletely turns its back upon and ignores 
the spirit and benefits of the jury system. 
When the issue of damages is submitted to the 
jury, eight persons of diversified background, temper-
ament, and judgment, eight persons "of various ages, 
occupations and experiences" (Adkins v. Zalasky, 59 
Idaho 292, 81 P. 2d 1090) are available to measure 
what is a fair damage figure in view of the extent of 
the injuries and in view of the "present cost of living 
and the diminished purchasing power of the dollar" 
(Bennett v. D & R. G. Co., (Utah) 213 P. 2d 325, at 
331). This is the right to which Plaintiff is entitled 
when she demands a jury,. trial. It is denied her if 
as Appellants contend, this Court must measure the 
fairness of the award against the judgment of a single 
trial judge who cannot be expected to be completely 
free from a point of view conditioned by his own 
individual background, experience, and tempera-
ment. 
Surely no reasonable mind can avoid the con-
clusion that what must be done here is to measure 
the verdict against the injury - not the verdict 
against the amount of remission which the trial 
court considered necessary to remove excess. See 
Pauley vs. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 194 P. 2d 123, 
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Incidentally,. the Court may be assured that 
respondent was disappointed and disturbed by the 
trial court's heavy hand in reducing this verdict. 
She did not believe, and does not now concede, that 
the original verdict was not justified by the evidence. 
The remittitur was accepted in the belief that thus 
an appeal would be avoided and that the plaintiff 
would at long last receive some prompt monetary 
assistance. 
Having accepted the remittitur m lieu of a 
new trial with its costs and delays, Respondent con-
cedes that she cannot now complain of what is con-
sidered to have been art unreasonable and unwar-
ranted reduction in the verdict. Hence this point is 
not here cross appealed. 
* * * * * 
Parenthetically-there is an independent basis 
upon which Appellants' argument in Point VIII must 
fail, as follows: 
Our Court is apparently among those jurisdictions 
which hold that if the reduction required by the trial 
court is sufficient to bring the verdict down to where 
the resulting figure has eliminated that portion of the 
verdict which seemed to have been the result of 
passion and prejudice, then the error has been cor-
rected, and in such a situation even though the orig-
inal verdict can be said to have been so excessive as 
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to have resulted fron1 passion and prejudice, the trial 
court does not coininit error in refusing to grant a 
new triaL This seen1s to be the reasoning of at least 
two Utah cases, to wit: 
Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 
138 P. 1185; Duffy v. U. P. R. Co., (Utah) 
218 P. 2d 1080. 
This doctrine is apparently recognized in Pauly 
v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123, at page 
125. 
Respondent does not at all concede, however, that 
she must stand or fall upon the acceptance of this 
doctrine. The burden of her position here is that 
when the original verdict is measured against the 
injury sustained, it is not excessive, but is justified 
and warranted by the evidence, and that conse-
quently no inference · (conclusive or otherwise) of 
passion or prejudice can be predicated thereon. 
* * * * * 
Therefore the unavoidable task at hand is to 
painstakingly review the evidence as to personal 
injury,and to put in proper perspective the thor-
oughly incomplete and one-sided statement of the 
record and unwarranted inferences, therefrom 
spelled out in Appellants' Brief. 
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Iu considering the following summary of the 
record, it will be helpful if the Court will have in 
mind that the accident happened on December 19, 
1949; and the the Plaintiff's complaint was filed on 
May 16, 1950; the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint was filed on February 26, 1951; and that 
the trial commenced on December 7, 1951. (Appel-
lants seek to n1ake some point of the Plaintiff's in-
creased prayer for damages in the supplemental com-
plaint as against th~ original complaint. The reason 
for this increase will become quite evident when it 
is shown that the true nature of plaintiff's injuries 
was not discovered until after the earlier complaint 
had been filed.) 
Plaintiff testified in her own behalf as follows: 
That she was in exceptionally good health before 
the accident, and even quite athletic and had not 
suffered from headache (R. 158); that she was regu-
larly employed as a waitress at the Temple Square 
Coffee Shop and earned an average of $35.00 for 
wages plus $48.00 in tips every two weeks (approxi-
mately $175 per month) (R. 146); that as a result of 
the accident she sustained a huge black spot, bump, 
on her forehead, a bruised knee, and a gradually 
stiffening neck which made her realize something 
was wrong that night, but that it was too late to go 
to a doctor (R. 158, 159, 161); that the next day she 
went to Dr. Kimball's office where her neck was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
69 
x-rayed, following which Dr. Kiinball immediately 
sent her to Dr. Clegg's office (R. 161); that Dr. Clegg 
immobilized her neck by putting her in a cast ( R. 
161); that she ·was in the cast for a week or so, and 
that when the doctor removed the cast, he put her in 
a metal brace (R. 161, Ex. G.); she fastened this 
brace to her neck in the presence of the jury, and 
without Appellants' objection, to demonstrate the 
awkward position in which it held her neck, chin 
and head (R. 162); that she wore this brace for two 
and one half to three months, night and day (R. 162); 
that the brace "was uncomfortable to say the least, 
uncomfortable night and day. You can't sit down. 
You can't stand up. It's inconvenient. You can't 
turn your head." (R. 162, 163); that during this 
period she definitely experienced pain, but not head-
aches (R. 162); that after the brace was removed she 
began to experience headache (R. 163); that during 
the time she wore the brace she could not sleep 
nights, took sleeping pills, but that they did no good 
after awhile (R. 163); that after the brace was re-
moved she returned to work, but found she was not 
as well as before the accident, that her neck was still 
stiff and her headaches started (R. 164); that she 
felt that she tired more easily and rapidly, and did 
not feel the same at all as before the accident (R. 
164); that she started taking aspirin and then empirin 
and then codein and finally phenobarbital (R. 164); 
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that from these drugs she secured only temporary 
relief but no let-up in the pain and headache (R. 
164); that on July 14, 1950 she first went to see 
Dr. Okleberry at the Salt Lake Clinic (R. 165); (she 
was under Dr. Okleberry's care and observation both 
by physical examination and x-ray thereafter until 
June, 1951); that in June of 1951, he put her "right 
back in a cast, right back where I started from" 
(R. 165, Ex. H); that she wore this cast throughout 
the summer of 1951 until Sept. 24, 1951 (R. 165); 
that after the second cast was removed she did not 
hold a steady job, but worked a few days at several 
different cafes (R. 166); that at the time of the trial 
she was still suffering pain "up the back of my neck 
to the back of my head, and then even persists onto 
the top of my head" (R. 166); that at the time of the 
trial, "if I find myself turning quickly to the left 
or to the right, I hear a banging click sound. I go 
weak all over" ( R. 166) ; that she still suffered 
headaches, but not quite to the extent as before 
she went to Dr. Okleberry (R. 166); that at the time 
of the trial she was unable to rest comfortably at 
night, that her headaches continued at frequent 
intervals, and were of such intensity that no matter 
what she took to reduce the pain, they still continued 
(R. 167.) 
Although Appellants now complain strenuously 
that the evidence of Plaintiff's injuries which went to 
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the jury did not "'arrant the verdict, at this point in 
the trial they made no effort to impeach or diminish 
the foregoing testimony by cross examining Mrs. 
Lodder as to the injuries, discomforts, pain, or head-
aches about which she had thus testified in detail. 
The jury could not help but get the impression that 
Appellants did not question that Mrs. Lodder had sus-
tained the injuries and experienced the resulting 
suffering to which she testified. 
Mr. Lodder, plaintiff's husband, testified as fol-
lows: That before the accident, plaintiff was "in 
good health. She was always jolly, just swell to 
have around. She was in good health, and never 
complained a minute of anything, and we got along 
real swell." (R. 79); that plaintiff "never missed any 
time at work. She liked her work and she was very 
good at her work" and was one of the best waitresses 
he had worked with (R. 79); that after the accident, 
the plaintiff "didn't seem to be the same. She has 
been irritable and a bit cross. She is always com-
plaining of headaches, and her son get's barked at 
once in awhile;" that "she is easily irritated. She 
get's cross. She is fairly hard to get along with at 
times. She was never that way before. She's not 
herself. She's just constantly with those headaches 
and having to take pills of so~e kind to take down her 
headaches, and she's not the same person." (R. 79); 
that at the time of the trial, plaintiff "is 'still cross and 
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irritable, always has headaches, not as often, but 
they are just as severe, and she is always complaining 
a bout them." C 80) ; "that she used to sleep very good 
and fall right to sleep, but she's very hard of sleeping 
now. She get's up in the middle of the night occa-
sionally, and she doesn't rest well at all." CR. 80); 
"that she wore the brace two and one half months, 
all day and all night, she never took it off CR. 81); 
that sometime "in June of 1951" they put her back 
in a cast and she wore that three and a half months." 
CR. 81). 
Here, again, Appellants indicated by their fail-
ure to cross examine Mr. Lodder, that they did not 
question the extent of Plaintiff's injuries or suffering. 
Dr. Clegg testified as follows: That Plaintiff 
first visited his office on December 20, 1949; that on 
taking her history, he learned that since the accident 
of the night before, she had experienced pain in the 
upper part of her neck CR. 107); that he examined 
x-ray's which had been taken by Dr. Kimball, and 
took ten sets of x-rays of his own; that his physical 
examination revealed tenderness to the touch in the 
upper neck, limitation of motion and some muscle 
spasm CR. 108) ; he identified Exhibit I as an x-ray 
he had taken of the upper portion of plaintiff's neck, 
March 21, 1950, and read it as showing a fracture 
line in the ring portion of the first cervicle vertebrae; 
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that from his x-rays hf' concluded that there had been 
a fracture or break in the ring of the first vertebrae 
of the cervicle spine (R. 109, 110); that he had 
treated the fracture by putting plaintiff in a plaster 
cast, and later a brace to support the neck, which he 
had instructed her to \Year day and night and to keep 
tight and snug at all times ( R. 110) ; that by radio-
graph on the 6th of February, he observed that the 
fracture showed as much union as could be expected 
at that time; that as of the 6th of March or shortly 
thereafter it appeared that the fracture had healed 
<R. 111); that while such a break is healing it is 
always painful (R. 112). 
Although Appellants attempted on cross exam-
ination of Dr. Clegg, and now attempt by argument 
CBr. p. 77) to establish that some portion of the in-
juries sustained by Plaintiff resulted from her failure 
to wear the brace at night during the latter part of 
the period when it was prescribed, nothing in Dr. 
Clegg's testimony, or in the testimony of Dr. Okle-
berry, as will be pointed out, supports this conclusion. 
Quite to the contrary, Dr. Clegg stated that in his 
opinion the fracture united as soon as could be ex-
pected, and Dr. Okleberry stated that the more serious 
injury consisting of the sprained neck, the angulation 
between vertebrae, the strained ligaments, the rup-
tured disc, and the traumatic arthritis (R. 134) were 
not caused or in any way contributed to by this minor 
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and inconsequential failure to follow to the letter the 
prescription as to wearing the brace at night, if such 
be the fact. (R. 135). 
Dr. Okleberry's testimony on this point is at page 
133 to 135 of the Record where he says, "I don't think 
not wearing it (the brace) at night had anything to 
do with the persistent symptoms." 
Dr. A. M. Okleberry testified both on direct and 
on cross examination at some length and covered the 
nature of the injuries quite comprehensively. He 
stated that Plaintiff first came under his care on 
July 14, 1950; that he examined her neck condition, 
took x-rays, and from those x-rays and the x-rays 
taken by Dr. Clegg, co:qcluded that Plaintiff had 
.sutained a fracture of the first cervicle vertebrae and 
in addition thereto a sprained neck which was evi-
denced by ligamentous injury ( R. 116, 117) ; that 
in taking her history he learned that her symptoms 
which had continued from the accident on December 
19, 1949, consisted of pain and stiffness in her neck 
and headache; that she appeared to be in distress as 
though her neck did paj~ ( R. 117) ; he prescribed 
h~at and massage and the wearing of the brace as 
much as possible; that she continued under his obser-
vation and treatment until April 27, 1951; that 
during this period although she was wearing the 
brace two or three hours each day, she was exper-
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iencing headaches of about the same intensity, and 
had a catching in her neck when she turned her 
head to the left (R. 118); that when he examined 
her on April 23, 1951, her symptoms indicated that 
she was probably developing traumatic arthritis or 
showed early symptoms of a ruptured disc (R. 119); 
that on April 27, 1951 he took additional x-rays with 
the neck in a hyper-extended position to see if they 
demonstrated any instability or excessive motion in 
the neck joints (R. 119-120); that from one of these 
x-rays (Ex. J.) he concluded that there was a slight 
angulation so that the interpretation was that there 
had been some injury to the ligaments surrounding 
the third and fourth cervicle vertebrae and that 
Plaintiff had some instability there, and that possibly 
some damage to an intervertebral disc was causing 
the recurring sharp catching pains in her neck ( R. 
121); that he suggested a plaster cast, and on June 
11, 1951, he applied the plaster cast; he felt certain 
that the neck should be immobilized and the cast was 
applied in the hope that the neck would heal and 
not go on and get worse (R. 123); that she wore the 
cast until September 24, 1951, when it was removed 
(R. 123); that the foregoing symptoms did result 
from a severe blow to the forehead or some other 
sudden jar on a date as far back as December 19, 
1949 (R. 123); that even while she was wearing this 
cast, plaintiff suffered sharp pain in the middle of 
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her neck anq pain and numbness in her left arm 
which could be expected as one of the outgrowths 
of this condition (R. 124); on October 23, 1951 her 
neck was about the same with catching pain a few 
times each day which never lasted very long, her 
headaches had become a little worse and she began 
to experience the headaches also on the sides of her 
head and complained of a ringing in her left ear; that 
she had about 25% less than normal range of motion 
in her neck in all directions ( R. 125) ; that he exam-
ined her on Monday prior to the trial by a prior ap-
pointment made in October, and that she had re-
cently experienced a bad occipital headache, neck 
pain and a little more stiffness in the neck than she 
usually had, also an audible and palpable click over 
the back of her neck in the junction of the neck and 
the thoracic part of the spine notwithstanding Plain-
tiff had "gone through about all the advice we could 
think of to give her." <R. 125). 
Dr. Okleberry then testified that it was possible 
Plaintiff would require an operation in the nature 
of a bone graft done across one or both of the joints 
which showed instability and in which ruptured disc 
material would have to be removed (R. 125, 126). 
The Doctor's prognosis was that Plaintiff might 
go on and improve "or at least not get any worse," 
but that she might suddenly get worse without any 
known cause, and would be more apt to have trouble 
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in the future than if she had not been injured ( R. 
1:!6). That no operation would be required unless 
the patient did get \Yorsc. (R. 126). 
The Doctor testified that he had not known until 
a few days before the trial that Plaintiff was in a 
lawsuit and that he believed her syn1pton1s were ob-
jective in that they showed angulation, fracture and 
instability; that these conditions would ""necessarily" 
cause pain and headache (R. 130); that the condition 
was not congenital but the result of trauma (R. 130); 
that ""the sprain and the instability that were still 
residual were considered the cause of the persistent 
headache" ( R. 131 ) ; that the sprain was a liga:r:nent 
as distinguished from a muscle sprain ( R. 131 ) . 
At this point in the Doctor's cross examination 
(R. 131) Appellants made an abortive attempt to 
prove that Plaintiff's injuries resulted not from the 
accident, but from the treatment which Dr. Holbrook 
had given her and which had taken the form of a 
stretching of the neck. The examination by Mr. 
Bagley is as follows: 
Question: "Doctor, do you or would you 
recommend stretching this woman's neck?" 
Answer: "No. It's already stretched too 
much. 
Q. "It's already been stretched, hasn't it? 
A. "That's right. This is one of those 
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things that has been classified and extensively 
known as a whiplash injury. Apparently she 
received both; first a whiplash type of injury 
and then a direct blow which caused her frac-
ture. One or the other caused it, maybe both. 
Can't tell." 
Respondent submits that this testimony effec-
tively refutes the Appellants' contention that the 
permanent injuries resulted from a stretching by Dr. 
Holbrook (Dr. Clegg's partner). The only fair and 
warranted inference from the evidence, is that when 
the Plaintiff's head was suddenly snapped forward 
and then backward in the collision, she suffered not 
only a fracture of the cervicle spine, but also the 
ligament sprain which gradually brought on the ob-
jectively determinable angulation and ruptured disc. 
Dr. Okleberry then further testified that during 
the course of his treatment of Plaintiff, he had recom-
mended that she attempt to continue with her work 
because "many of these things last too long for people 
to wait for them to get well and stay off work for-
ever." (R. 131, 1932). 
Dr. Okleberry concluded his testimony on the 
cross examination by Mr. Jensen, as follows: (R. 138-
139) 
Q. "Well, why is it that subsequent im-
mobilization would help where it wouldn't 
have initially? 
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A. ··It isn't certain \vhcther it has helped, 
not at all certain. 
Q. ''Don't you thi11k she's in better con-
dition now than she w(l.s at the tinH' when you 
noticed the excessive angulation in those ver-
tebrae? 
A. ··1 kind of doubt it. 
Q. ''Do you think that you're placing her 
in a cast this sun1mer was a con1plete waste 
of time? 
A. ''Well, I don't know for sure. 
0. "Well, now, in your direct exarnina-
tion you stated, did you not, that at this tin1e 
that the condition of her neck had improved 
and that further immobilization would not 
help her. 
A. '"Her neck would improve while she 
was in the cast. It may not be any better now 
than it was before we put the cast on ... From 
the standpoint of her symptoms, at least, I 
don't think she's cured. 
Q. "Well, now, the only symptoms you 
are talking about V\Then you speak of stand-
point of symptoms, is her complaints of pain 
and stiffness. Isn't that correct. 
A. "That's right, plus one other thing, 
this very definite, audible, palpable click that 
she has in her neck, it didn't change that." 
Mrs. Ovena Kalm testified as follows: That she 
had known Plaintiff for over three years; that she 
had w_orked with Plaintiff as a waitress six days a 
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week at the Temple Square llotel (R. 141); that prior 
to the accident Plaintiff was very healthy and ener-
getic, didn't take time off, didn't complain about 
illness or anything, had never complained about 
headache, had been a very efficient waitress, one who 
remembered her orders and was pleasant with the 
customers ( R. 142); that after Plaintiff returned to 
\vork in the Spring following the accident, there was 
no comparison in her health; she was pale, she had 
lost considerable weight, was in a great deal of pain 
an awful lot of the time and Mrs. Kalm didn't even 
see how she could keep on the job she was in such 
severe pain so much of the time; that Plaintiff just 
looked ghastly much of the time; that there were 
times when "you would see her (Plaintiff) turn her 
head just ever so slightly, and she would look like 
she was going to faint." (R. 143). 
This witness then stated (R. 143-144). 
"She would become ghastly white and 
just-well, you could tell that she was suffer-
ing from that pain, and there was one occasion 
that I remember very distinctly that she was 
clearing the table, and she was sort of leaning 
forward over the table, clearing the dishes, and 
she just seemed to go weak and pale and I 
thought she was going to drop her whole hand-
ful of dishes. One of the other girls went over 
to her and said, 'Merlene, are you all right?' 
She seemed dazed and turned and walked into 
the kitchen without even answering." 
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Mrs. Kahn then testified (R. 1·~·+) that after the 
·accident, Plaintiff \vas not a very good vvaitress and 
she noticed particularly that: 
". . . she couldn't reme1n ber her orders 
at all. She 'vould go to the kitchen aud seen1 
to have forgotten entirely \Yhat she was even 
doing. She couldn't remember what one cus-
tomer had ordered. It \vas hard on us all and 
mainly hard on her because she 'vould get 
confused." 
On cross exan1ination by Mr. Lewis, Mrs. Kalm 
testified that: 
"I am anxious for Mrs. Lodder's health, 
nothing else, and I can see that it has been 
greatly impaired." (R. 145). 
In summary, Respondent earnestly submits that 
the foregoing evidence shows that the Plaintiff sus-
tained the following injuriesz 
1. A severe bump on the forehead which caused 
a fracture of the ring at the first cervicle of the neck. 
2. A whiplash or snapping injury which caused 
a sprained neck that developed its objective symp-
toms some moths after the injury and become demon-
strable by x-ray evidence of angulation o:r spread-
ing between the third and 'fourth vertebrae, and by 
an audible and palpable clicking and catching. 
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3. A ligamentous InJury, traumatic arthritis, 
and ruptured disk in the same area. 
4. Severe and prolonged discomfort amounting 
to physical suffering as the result of wearing the 
first cast and, thereafter, the metal brace for a period 
of nearly three months, and the second cast for a 
period of nearly four months. 
5. Extreme and prolonged pain and suffering as 
the result of the direct pain in the neck, particularly 
at times of catching, but, more importantly, because 
of the resulting headaches which were of such 
intensity as to be beyond the reach of normal seda-
tives. 
6. A resulting loss of weight, inability to sleep, 
consequent emotional upset and disturbance resulting 
in both a change of personality, change of attitude 
toward her husband and child, and also an inability 
to continue successfully with her employment be-
cause of loss of m,emory, impaired general health, 
recurring severe headaches, limitation of motion in 
the neck and head, and an extreme catching pain ac-
companying any unusual motion. 
7. Special damages by way of loss of wages and 
medical expenses amounting to $1,466.50. 
8. A neck injury of such permanence that, at 
the time of trial two years after the accident, and 
after following the advice and prescription of the best 
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orthopedic surgeon in the intermountain country for 
a period of 18 months, including the wearing of the 
second cast for 4 months, plaintiff was not cured, 
and her doctor could state only that at least he hoped 
she would not get worse and would not require an 
operation to remove the injured ligament and disc 
material. 
From the foregoing, Respondent submits that 
the jury was warranted in awarding a verdict of 
$25,000 to the Plaintiff as a reasonable sum to com-
pensate her for her injuries and losses; that such an 
award is fair and reasonable in view of the evidence 
as to injury and loss; and that such a verdict, in view 
of all the evidence, ''is not so grossly excessive and 
disproportionate to the injury that the court can say 
from that fact alone that as a matter of law the ver-
dict must have been arrived at by passion or pre-
judice." It did not shock the conscience of eight 
tried and true jurors. It does not shock the con-
science of Respondent, and should not indicate pas-
sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury 
to any person who fairly and patiently reviews the 
evidence on which the jury based its verdict. 
Respec;tfully submitted, 
OWEN&WARD 
THATCHER & YOUNG 
Atorn~ys for Respondent. 
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